Essay Networks

The Last Colony

An Analysis of UN involvement in Western Sahara

One of the UN’s proudest achievement is the worldwide decolonisation which it helped facilitate during the latter portion of the twentieth century. This was driven by the increasingly popular belief that ethnocentrism was no longer a proper justification for ruling over a people who had a longer claim to the land. A focus was shifted from trying to subdue rebel movements in various colonial areas to trying to help them establish a fully functional government of independence, and eventually stability. In Northwestern Africa, however, far from public attention, these goals have yet to be realized. The Saharawi people, though they can trace a clear cultural identity and claim to their land, are not in control of it- rather they are exiled into the most inhospitable part of their region or even outside the national borders. Having been occupied by France, Spain, Mauritania, and now Morocco, the Saharawi people have yet to be truly sovereign in the past 116 years. The United Nations established MINURSO, the French acronym for the UN Mission for the Referendum In Western Sahara, to help organize a vote of the people to determine their fate. Unfortunately, in what the Economist has called a “triumph for procrastination,” the results of this UN mission have been mixed at best.

Background

Although the struggle over control of this region is relatively new compared with the age-old hatred brewing in such hot-spots as the Middle East, it is important to understand the historical context from which the present-day issue has arisen. The ethnic group at the center of this conflict is the Saharawi people, the native inhabitants of this region. These people are of Arabian descent, tracing their roots back to eleventh century Yemen. Though certain ties may be drawn between the Tuareg and Berber of neighboring countries, they claim a distinct cultural identity. They speak Hassaniya Arabic, and the predominant religion, Islam is strongly integrated into their society. (CIA World Factbook)

A key component of the present day issue is deciding who exactly had control of the region in its early history. Mauritania claims that the Empire of Ghana (based in present-day Mauritania) ruled over the region from approximately 600-1200 A.D. and claimed possession of the southern third of the area. Morocco claims that it had been under its control during the subsequent Almoravide dynasty. The Saharawi dispute this claim by declaring that in fact, Western Saharan tribes had united to conquer the whole of Morocco in a reign that lasted for one hundred years before disintegration from within. (History Today, 2)

Up until the nineteenth century, little was known by the outside world about these people, except for some trading They were primarily nomadic, but the region way united by Alt Arabian (Hand of the Forty), a ruling council consisting of forty tribal elders nominated from the various tribes. (History Today, 2) In 1885, the Congress of Berlin granted Spain control of the coastal region between Dhakla and Tarfaya, where trading posts were established. Spain, wishing to gain a foothold in this region of heavy French domination, began pressing further into the interior- to the objection of France. Over the next few decades, they people found themselves caught in the middle of this bloody power struggle. The Saharawi cite 1906 as the official start of the Western Sahelian war of independence, when they unified to take up arms against their colonial oppressors. This was crushed in 1934 as the resistance was decisively defeated and the official boundaries of the Spanish Sahara were solidified. In 1949, the purest phosphate mines in the world were discovered at Bucraa, which would permanently alter the course of history of this region. The Saharawi people were exploited, employed at meager wages while the profits went to the Spanish economy. This became a call to action for the Saharawi and in 1960, the independence movement is officially revived., and the Saharawi Autonomous Democratic Republic (SADR) is declared.

The sixties saw a drastic turn of events, as the United Nations embarks on the long road to worldwide decolonization. In 1963, the region was placed on the list of areas to be decolonised and in 1965, the General Assembly officially resolved that Spain should relinquish possession of its Saharan province. In 1966, the Special Political and Decolonization Committee called for an referendum in Western Sahara to determine its fate. Spain, however, all but ignored this request. Echoing this frustration, the POLISARIO front (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro) is born, which turned to guerilla warfare as a way to expedite the independence process. In 1974, a census was taken in preparation for this vote, but this action fell stagnant. Two years later, Spain finally officially pulled out of the country- motivated not only by the independence movement or the U.N. mandate, but by an increasingly internal focus of the nation adjusting to democracy after the dictatorship of Generalissimo Franco.

Still left with no clear plan for the implementation of self determination when Spain abandoned the colony, its neighbors Morocco and Mauritania began occupation, claiming their historical precedent. The issue had been turned over to the International Court of Justice to discern the validity of these assertions. It was resolved that while there may be some degree of truth in these claims, it did not warrant robbing the Saharawi people of their right to self-determination. This ruling, however, was not accepted. It was particularly no match for the fiery nationalism of King Hassam II, determined to reclaim “Greater Morocco,” (which included all of Mauritania as well as parts of Algeria). One day after the ruling of the ICJ, he embarked on the infamous “Green March.” (Dirsch, 407) Over 350,000 Moroccans began settlement of the Western Sahara, induced by government subsidies and property grants. Violence and suppression by way of terror became regular features in the life of the Saharawi people, who began to flee en masse to refugee camps in Algeria. Through a small victory was enjoyed in 1979 when Mauritania withdrew from the region, the revolutionary government was exiled into the region’s arid interior, kept out by a vast sand wall.

Not until 1985, when Morocco suddenly withdrew from the Organization of African Unity in protest to the SADR did the UN again seriously direct its attention toward the issue. Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar paid a visit to the region, and concluded that the UN would mediate the conflict as soon as there was direct dialogue between the adversaries established. POLISARIO then advanced an plan of action for the referendum to be implemented in conjunction with UN security forces to stabilize the region in the meantime. This was discussed between POLISARIO and Moroccan officials in Saudi Arabia. Though the meetings were secret, the even helped clear the path for UN mediation. Finally, in august 1988, after meeting separately with both sides in Geneva, the UN presented a plan for a ceasefire and referendum.

In 1990, the UN Mission for the Referendum In Western Sahara (MINURSO) was officially established, to assure Morrocan compliance wiht UN rulings, facilitate the release of political prisoners, and most importantly to lead the region to a binding referendum deciding its fate- total inclusion into Morocco or total independence. ( Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, 188) The Identification Commission was set up to deal with what is still today the biggest obstacle to implementing a referendum- determining who is allowed to vote. The process is not as simple as simply polling everyone in the region, as 165,000 people reside outside of the region’s borders- the most recent generation has never even seen their homeland. The process is further complicated by the 300,000 Moroccan citizens who currently reside in the region as a result of King Hassam’s “Green March” campaign, who would obviously not be in favor of a Saharawi government. The proposed solution to this is to only allow voters whose lineage is traced to residence in the region during the 1974 census. This task has proven to be extremely daunting. There are several obstacles to this effort to properly register each eligible Saharawi person, and giving each individual a personal identification card. Firstly, the Saharawi culture is by nature nomadic. Life is governed by spoken words and tribal custom- not written documentation (the literacy rate in 1988 had been estimated as low as 3 percent (UNMS, June 11). Furthermore, a significant portion of this already migrant populous has been uprooted and sent across national boundaries, additionally complicating the process of tracing their origins. Finally, there is the added bureaucracy of dealing with records conducted by a third party- Spain, whose thoroughness at the time is questionable at best. Nonetheless, the process was laboriously carried out, as MINURSO went into the Algerian refugee camps to obtain to obtain their figures, a process that lasted over ten years.

Unfortunately, the issue is still mired in confusion. In 1997, there was great hope with the establishment of Kofi Annan as the UN Secretary General, who pledged his commitment to bringing about a referendum that would allow the Saharawi people to vote on self determination once and for all. He nominated a personal envoy, James Baker III, former US Secretary of State to oversee the process. Though Baker’s initial intent was to implement the MINURSO plan as had been agreed, relatively little progress was made. As Annan expressed in October 2001, “Regrettably I cannot report any progress in overcoming the implementation of the United Nations settlement plan.” (Xinhua News Agency, Oct 27 2000) Then, in what the Economist called “the UN’s U-turn,” Baker radically reversed his policy in June 2001, deciding that perhaps a referendum could not be achieved. He argued instead for Western Sahara to be inducted into Morocco as an “autonomous” province. The Saharawi would be Moroccan citizens under the Moroccan flag and constitution, but would be given control over “local” matters. Needless to say, this proposal has been rejected by the POLISARIO front, but as time goes on, its options are becoming increasingly limited.

Analysis

At present, the issue is still resolving two very different conclusions on who should be able to vote. According to the Saharawi, 165,000 Saharawi nationals meet the criteria- but the UN has concluded that only 85,000 fully qualify. The discrepancy between these numbers only demonstrate the dubious nature of both positions. The Saharawi people a variety of skin-tones, many looking much like their Moroccan counterparts and many resembling various ethnic groups in neighboring Algeria (Dirsch, 414) The Moroccan government cites an additional 65,000 ethnic Moroccans which should be allowed to vote, claiming that their ancestors resided in the region before the 1974 census. They also go on to criticize the UN figures, saying that it includes 10,000 people from neighboring ethnic tribes who settled in the camps seeking refuge from the droughts of the 1980′s (Time International, 38). In this situation, where such figures vary drastically, it may be postulated that both of the disputing parties are inaccurate in their figures, as each side holds a vested interest in their outcome. In this case, the most just way to proceed would be to go with the figures of the U.N, who in theory should remain impartial, and can definitely be demonstrated as more objective than the government of Morocco or the SADR. Kofi Annan seems to be headed in this direction. In November 2000, he agreed to examine the Moroccan claims by bringing the 75,000 in question before I.D. committees, but the results of this action are as of yet inconclusive (Economist, 64)

An additional hole in the MINURSO plan is its silence on the issue of the status of the Moroccan settlers, which currently outnumber the Saharawi. Many settlers fear a great backlash, forcing them to live as second class citizens, or flee their homes and return to Morocco- whose troubled economy may have no place for them. This echoes of the purge of foreigners from Nigeria in the late 1980′s to make room for returning refugees, the persecution of the Arab population of Mozambique, even the genocide against the Tutsis of Rwanda. Whenever there is a transfer of power, the oppression is often transferred toward innocent civilians who prospered in the under the former rule. This issue should be addressed, provisions should be made in the plan for allowing for their human rights to be protected or their peaceful repatriation to Morocco if they so choose. An extension of the UN peacekeeping mission to oversee this

transition shall be necessary. The Saharawi exiled president suggests “American style green cards” (Time International, 39) to allow the Moroccans to remain working there. Unsurprisingly, many Moroccans object to being demoted to foreigner status in a place where they now hold citizenship.

Above all, this question only stresses that time is of the essence in this manner. For the longer we wait before offering the Saharawi the opportunity for independence, the more validity the Moroccan settlers gain to the claim of the land. As we have seen with the Han Chinese settlement of Tibet and Xinjiang, the occupation of Kurdish regions by other Caucasian peoples, or the settling of the American West which displaced the native peoples, a cultural identity is quickly diluted when a foreign majority establishes itself in the area.

Another problem with the U.N. proceedings in the Western Sahara has been trying to resolve the issue of funding. The project has proved to be a significant drain on the U.N. budget, with relatively little in the way of substantial results being achieved. Ever since the beginning, money has been a problem for MINURSO. Since the organization experienced a three year delay between its proposal and implementation, it came into being when the attention of the U.N. was diverted elsewhere, to such peacekeeping projects as Angola, El Salvador, Kuwait, and Cambodia. The original budget projection was 300 million dollars for a mission that would last thirty-six weeks, but seeing that the peacekeeping expenditures were quickly becoming entrenched in debt, the figure was virtually halved to 160,000 (Durch, 419). Measures which had to be cut included provisions for ensuring peaceful repatriation of the Saharawi and the U.N. presence at the refugee camps themselves. Since its inception, however, the mission has been continually renewed due to its notorious lack of progress, which has led to a total expenditure over 500 million dollars at an estimated 4.3 million dollars per month. (Economist, 53) This shows the consequences of procrastination in the U.N. and a lackluster commitment to follow through on its intentions. Rather than spend the initial sum required to complete the project, the Security Council has voted to keep the mission active but perpetually strapped for funds. Moreover, this neglectful attitude led to abuse by certain UN officials. Due to the particularly inhospitable climate and dangerous situations MINURSO officials had to contend with, they were paid inflated salaries as “hardship” compensation. Despite these “hardships,” many officials overstayed their term in order to get additional compensation (New Internationalist, 24.) This further demonstrates that when an issue is not on the forefront (as the early years of MINURSO were overshadowed by the more sensational events in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina), it is more subject to internal corruption. Hence, not only should more funds have been allotted to the mission, but their should have been a clearer plan for their implementation.

A more direct issue MINURSO has had to come to terms with during its early years has been allegations of a heavy Moroccan influence over MINURSO proceedings. Morocco had been known to tap UN phones and intercept their mail, and troops conducted regular searches of UN territory down to the living quarters. The Moroccan flag was even required to be flown along with the UN flag at the headquarters in Laayoune. One reason that this had been allowed to occur was the pro-Moroccan bias of the Secretary Generals involved. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who oversaw the inception of the plan had fully supported the broad interpretation of what constituted a Saharawi, allowing King Hassam to first claim that these ethnic Moroccans had a right to vote. It has been suggested, though not proven, that this can be correlated with Pérez de Cuéllar being offered a position in a holding company, Omnium Nord-Africain. (New Internationalist, 24.) Boutros-Boutros Ghali, who saw the implementation of MINURSO had had long-standing ties with King Hassam II during his term as the Egyptian foreign minister, and continually postponed the measures which would lead to the referendum. Frank Ruddy, UN ambassador and former deputy chair of the MINURSO Identification committee remarks : “‘During my time in Western Sahara Morocco conducted without a raised eyebrow from Boutros-Ghali’s hand-picked representative who ran the referendum a campaign of terror against the Saharan people. I had not seen anything like it since I observed the apartheid government in South Africa in action against blacks.”(New Internationalist, 25.) This tattered reputation of the committee, however, is not without hope. King Mohammed VI, who inherited the throne in 2000, has shown to be much more supportive to the cause of the UN, and his replacement of Driss Basri- the Minister of the Interior charged with using brutal repression tactics against the Saharawi was a sign of relief for many. Corruption should not be stood for anywhere, but it is of special importance that it be eradicated in the UN. The idea of peacekeeping missions was implemented for the express purpose of having an objective third party. If the mediator tends to show favoritism towards the repressor, the peacekeeping mission becomes little more than a drain on UN expenses, a source of embarrassment for the organization as a whole, and a way to legitimize the violation of a people’s right to self-determination.

Another factor which complicates the situation is the prisoners of war being held by both sides. Morocco has had a history of disappearing and imprisoning Saharawi activists throughout its occupation of the territory. It claims to have released all its political figures, but the Saharawi dispute this claim, as many of their loved ones are yet unaccounted for. (Western Sahara Online) The POLISARIO front holds about 1,900 Moroccan political prisoners in its camps in the interior. This is a constant source of frustration, one Moroccan pilot who has been in a camp for 20 years said of the peace process that there was “more process than peace.” (Time International, 38) Of course, with Western Sahelian independence, their prisoners much be released. However, the Moroccan government needs to reciprocate. If Saharawi prisoners are still being held captive, they should be freed- if they are dead, they should at least come forward with the information. Only when this constant source of unrest is put at ease, can Moroccan and Saharawi people truly begin reconciliation.

It is also important to examine the interest of the major world powers- or lack thereof. Though the United States extolled the values of self-determination, it did not wish to risk upsetting cordial relations with Morocco, a key Muslim ally in the volatile Middle East situation, over an issue which has such little national interest. France, Morocco’s former colony, lent its support to Morocco. The POLISARIO front had initially received financial backing and military supplies from Libya, Cuba, and Algeria, but at present the latter is the only foreign power to actively support the POLISARIO position (Dirch, 408). Though 54 states officially recognize the SADR, the Saharawi have yet to rally the support of a major power. (SADR website) This leaves them in a most precarious situation, with Algeria, which is anything but stable, as their only ally. Without the official support of the International Community, the Saharawi people may be left in a situation similar to when Spain initially pulled out of the region- unstable and vulnerable to foreign exploitation. The lack of foreign support implicates the importance of an effective UN peacekeeping plan to oversee not only the referendum, but the long road to self-reliance which shall ensue.

Apart from the attention of foreign governments, more efforts must be made to rally the people of the world. Tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and the Middle East captured the attention of the world community. Charities banded together to provide aid for refugees, people lobbied their governments to advocate human rights, and events surrounding the conflicts were heavily reported by the media. By comparison, the situation in the Western Sahara has received relatively little attention. Many would be hard pressed to find the region on a map, much less be able to give an informed opinion about the political situation. One reason is the relatively small size of the populous being repressed. The primary cause of public neglect, however, is its relatively obscure bearing on foreign conflicts. It is so remote from any major population centers, and its primary resources- phosphates and fishing off its coasts- are not heavily sought after by any major powers. Unlike most nations freed from their colonial possessors in the latter part of the twentieth century, Western Saharan forces were never solicited directly by either side of the foreign war. Nonetheless, a people is still being repressed and not given access to land which is rightfully theirs- as supported by the ICJ decision. As stated by Congressman Joseph Pitts of the United States Western Sahara Foundation: ” This may be an obscure issue for most Americans, but those who know the whole story become dedicated supporters of the Saharawi people.” (Africa News Service. June 29, 2001) The Saharawi’s exiled president, Mohammed Abdelaziz comments that international attention is “the sole guarantee of a just and durable solution” Such an infraction on human rights should be unilaterally condemned and an expedient path towards giving the Saharawi people control over their own destiny should be called for by people around the world.

The UN now stands at a critical crossroads in its mediation in the region. Twelve years have passed, and MINURSO has still yet to sufficiently organize a vote. The 101 member Saharawi parliament and president keep waiting for the day when they will be installed in Laayoune to rule over the country. There is a tremendous amount of frustration over the delay in the proceedings, not only by the Saharawi but also the Moroccan settlers with their uncertain fate, and the UN Secretary General and General Assembly. That frustration was echoed with the recent “third option” which proposes to have Western Sahara as an autonomous region of Morocco. Hopefully, this will not be realized. To do so would be to forfeit everything the UN has worked to establish in the past thirty years, and to betray the Saharawi people. Under such a system, the POLISARIO would still feel compelled to use guerilla warfare tactics and be less likely to release their political prisoners. Moreover, this would make the past eleven years of MINURSO from reporting slow progress to being a complete failure. The years of effort and expense would be all for naught. A small degree of hope rests with the slowly increasing media coverage and public attention being shifted toward the region, there will be more pressure placed on Morocco and MINURSO to act in favor of the Saharawi people, but with the recent “war on terrorism,” already neglected issues such as the repatriation of the Western Sahara would be placed on the back burner. At the dawn of a new millennium however, a timely resolution becomes increasingly crucial, for every day that the UN waits and deliberates is another day that the Saharawi people live exiled in a land that is not their own.

Bibliography

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